Garrett further held that a trial court of California.

 Garrett further held that a trial court "must liberally construe the evidence submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion," and that the "reasoned explanation required in an expert declaration filed in opposition to [such aJ motion need not be as detailed or extensive as that required in expert testimony presented in support of a sun1rnary judgment motion or at trial." (Id. ATP. 189 [emphases added).) Thus, "[liberally construing" the declaration at issue, the Comment of Appeal found it admissible. (Id. at pp. 187, 189.)

These recent decisions suggest that "gatekeeping" includes both denying and allowing evidence through the gate. It thus remains to be seen whether courts \vill apply Sargon expansively or narrowly. Will the "decisional law" of California  Los Angeles business lawyer develop to create further "reasons for excluding expert opinion testimony," as Sargon allows? (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772 & fn.6.) What constitutes a "reasonable basis" for an expert's opinion, and how broad is a trial court's "gatekeeping" power to make that de­cision? (Id. at p. 770.) Is there really a differ­ ent standard to be applied to declarations as opposed to living testimony or at summary judgment as opposed to trial? (Garrett, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.)

In any event, will trial courts heed Sar­ go11's warning to "be cautious in excluding expert testimony"? (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal. 4th at p. 772.) If so, what will such caution entail? Considering the varying ways in which the Courts of Appeal already have interpret­ ed Sargon - alternatively enforcing a "sub­stantial gatekeeping responsibility" to exclude expert testimony and applying a "lib­eral construction" of evidence to admit such testimony - the journey to fully discover California's standard for the admissibility of expert opinion testimony may not have ended with Sargon. It may have just begun. This marks my 27th year in the law, although I've only been licensed for 18. I got my first law job of a kind in 1985 when I was hired by a Chicago sole practitioner as his file clerk/firm messenger/general office assistant. I worked hard and learned fast and was quickly promoted to the receptionist, then legal secretary, and then a paralegal.

I left there and was hired at successively larger firms that did more and more complex civil litigation. By the time I started law school, my legal support resume included substantive work on major securities fraud, product liability, criminal, and catastrophic injury cases. I had drafted basic motions and orders, organized and indexed thousands of documents, and sent out hundreds of letters.

As the first in my family to attend college, let alone any post-graduate professional education, working as a legal secretary and/or paralegal gave me the confidence that I, too, could become a lawyer. Working with lawyers day in and day out with varying skills, practice areas and firm sizes made me think "I can do that." The mystery of the law was gone.

After passing the Bar in 1993, I had to await licensing because I hadn't yet applied for my moral character clearance. So I got a temporary job as "trial support" with a plaintiff's' civil litigation firm that, at the time, did product liability asbestos mesothelioma cases (which I still handle today) as well as catastrophic injury and construction-defect ones. Because of my non-lawyer legal background that included many hours on the ground "in trial" - I knew what to do from the first moment and so they immediately assigned me to work on a trial and actually be in court.